THE last week has seen an extraordinary surge in Russian activity both against Ukraine – 600 drones and other projectiles in a single night – and against Nato countries.
Estonia’s airspace was violated for some 12 minutes by Russian manned aircraft (too long to be a mistake), Poland was subjected to a very large number of drone incursions and Denmark’s airspace and military air bases were reconnoitred by drones launched from a Russian tanker in the Baltic, although Danish authorities have so far stopped short of pointing the finger. French and British airlines and airports were disrupted by a cyber-attack. Today, the Russians are using every device to swing the elections in Moldova their way. What is going on?
Let’s deal first with Moldova. This small state sits on the western border of Ukraine and since the Russian invasion of Ukraine it has embarked on a path to align more closely with the West, its initial goal being EU membership.
In Russian eyes, EU membership is the precursor to Nato membership and as I have remarked before in this column, it was the threat of that progression by Ukraine that led to the Russian re-annexation of the Crimea in 2014.
Moldova under Russian control would provide a useful flank for Russian activities against Ukraine and the West and we should not forget, as again I have previously reported in this column, that the Russians already have a military presence there in the breakaway region of Transnistria.
The return of a pro-Western government in Moldova would be another humiliation to the Kremlin on top of the accession to Nato by Finland and Sweden. They will use every tool they have to prevent it: electoral fraud of all kinds, disinformation and misinformation, bribery and naked threats.
So, Moldova is one avenue sought by the Kremlin to penetrate Nato solidarity. The Kremlin’s courting of Slovakia and Hungary, whose leaders openly admire Putin, is in the same vein. It follows the same strategy, therefore, as the other forms of attack described above. These attacks are designed to achieve several ends.
First, to widen and deepen cracks in Nato solidarity – Hungary has already said that it will continue to buy Russian oil and gas, and will not be part of the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line plan.
Secondly, it is to demonstrate Western weaknesses in defences. In the case of the drone attacks, this has been to a degree successful, as dealing with drone swarms is a complex matter.
To use an air defence missile costing hundreds of thousands of dollars against a drone which can be bought off the shelf for $200 (£149) makes no sense. Shooting down drones over populated areas will cause civilian casualties, as shooting down German aircraft during the Blitz did, although the numbers have never been released, having been buried in the overall figures.
To deal with these, Nato countries will rapidly have to develop the ability to identify drones, then attack through electronic warfare, by jamming, disrupting and decoying their guidance systems. Gun systems like the naval DS30B 30mm Oerlikon cannon will have to be bought and emplaced at military sites. But so far, Russian drones seem able to operate where and when their operators desire, and this is not a situation that Nato can tolerate.
Thirdly it is about diversion, a subset of the old Soviet technique of Maskirovka, or deception.
There is absolutely no prospect of a negotiated end to the war, except on Russia’s terms. These mean the reduction of Ukraine to a rump, with no prospect of joining the EU or Nato, and with no means of defence. This is clear from the Alaska Summit. What this means is that European Nato countries will wish to continue to support Ukraine financially, but if they are diverted by Russian probing into moving resources towards their own defence rather than that of Ukraine, the prospect of a strategic stalemate like that in Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia – Putin’s best hope for the retention of his new territories – comes much closer.
Of course this could backfire: although the US support package has been scrapped, European nations may well look hard at the huge deposits of frozen Russian financial assets and decide to confiscate them and use them for military aid to Zelensky.
Last, it is to test the coherence and coordination of the Allies. Russian manned aircraft were ‘escorted’ out of Estonian airspace by Italian aircraft. The messaging about future responses has been mixed. Some say shoot them down, others say not. To Putin, this is evidence of a fractured Nato, something the alliance must address, and quickly. Why? Because Putin is testing the West’s ability and willingness to respond to threats.
Do not think that this is about the response of European nations: it is not – it is about what the US will do to back its allies.
Until now, US messaging has blown hot and cold, but President Trump’s positive response when asked if Russian aircraft should be shot down is a change of direction and one which may give Putin pause for thought.
He may also be wondering why Secretary of War Hegseth has summoned all US three-star and above generals and admirals to Virginia today.
This involves some 800 officers from all over the world – massively disruptive when it could have been done using video conferencing. The generals and admirals, too, must be wondering what it is all about as there has been nothing released officially. Some sources believe this presages the threatened reduction in general officer posts by 20 per cent which has been signalled since May; others hope it will be a rallying call and a commitment to defend the West. It should not pass unremarked that Hegseth is now, as in the Second World War, not Secretary of Defense but Secretary of War.
Does this point to a U-turn in US policy? Hegseth, Secretary of State Rubio and others view China as the most pressing defence issue for America and believe that Europe should be left to fend for itself. However, the President is clearly angered and frustrated by his inability to bring the Russians to the negotiating table and be seen as the peacemaker. Having told Zelensky early in his presidency that Ukraine must make concessions, he now sees that this merely emboldened Putin and brought the rejection of his own proposals at the Alaska Summit.
Although he sticks by his line that Europe must do far more for its own defence, he probably now realises that in the short term, the US must continue to underwrite the security of its allies.
If Russia succeeds in Ukraine, and perhaps elsewhere, this will only encourage Chinese ambitions on Taiwan. It is no coincidence that the Russians are now training the newly formed Chinese airborne force. Thus Trump’s apparent reversal of his earlier line in saying that Ukraine can win on the battlefield and restore its pre-war territory – but only with Nato support.
Russia’s response was to take this head-on and declare that Russia and the West are at war. Putin, therefore, will continue to probe and test Nato, always below the threshold of open conflict, because Russia cannot take on the United States and emerge as anything but burning trash. Putin knows this. Without the US, Nato cannot win against Russia. With it, Nato cannot lose.
