PRESIDENT Trump’s warning that the US could pull out of Nato should shock even the most complacent and anti-American elements on the political left. Mr Trump has raised the issue in private discussions with White House aides in recent days, and on Wednesday confirmed that he was ‘absolutely’ reviewing membership.
I have underlined several times in these pages why this is so – the global reach and sheer size of US military power and the fact that the USA brings capabilities to Nato that no other country has, or is ever likely to have. With American backing, Nato has credibility in its deterrent posture – deterrence being built on capability and will to use those capabilities. Without the US, credibility remains only in the nuclear sphere because of the independent British and French arsenals, but not in the conventional sphere. An aggressor could well, therefore, be tempted to take actions that fell short of the use, or riposte, of weapons of mass destruction. A Russian incursion into a non-Nato state, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Moldova; or even a limited incursion in the Baltic, either on land or at sea.
The President’s threat came as the latest in a sequence of angry responses to the failure of traditional allies to give their support, as he sees it, to the US/Israeli war on Iran. Not least was his disappointment with Starmer, first over his refusal to give the US use of Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire for strikes on Iran, second over Starmer’s reluctance to deploy the Royal Navy and then his refusal to take the lead on re-opening the Strait of Hormuz. France’s preference for diplomacy has irked him too. Austria, not a Nato member, has become the latest EU country to deny US military use of its airspace.
Whether or not this outburst was more than a mark of his frustration with unappreciative allies – more wake-up call than genuine warning – it still suggests an alarming failure on his part to understand what Nato is and is not; why a US pull-out would be a lose/lose situation for Europe and the US.
Nato is an alliance founded in the Treaty of 1949 and is about mutual defence.* Article Five affirms that an attack on one member state is an attack on all and obliges all other states to come to the aid of whoever has been attacked. During the Cold War, there was no discussion about resources, or caveats, or vetoes – what mattered was survival. Once the Cold War was over, nations did have a choice about what they committed – and in the case of every European country, it was less.
The water was muddied by the Nato-led expeditions to Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. These were carried out using coalitions built on the Alliance and in some cases, simultaneously, coalitions built within the Alliance. For example, in Afghanistan, there were really two International Assistance Forces (ISAFs): one was a coalition of the willing confronting insurgency and terrorism; the other was a non-kinetic coalition based on the Bonn Agreement, concerned with nation-building. Some people and member states may therefore believe that Nato is a vehicle for Allies to climb aboard and support US (or French, or British) expeditionary operations. It is not.
President Trump’s outrage appears to be built on this fundamental misconception. His remarks, however, even if taken no further in terms of action, risk shattering the trust within the Alliance already fractured by his ‘art of the deal diplomacy’ threats to his ally Denmark and its territory in Greenland. But could he pull the US out of Nato? Not easily: US law requires, first, a two-thirds majority in Congress to abandon the Alliance. As things stand, he is never likely to get this but even so the matter of trust, or lack of it, remains. The more significant question is whether the US would come to the aid of its allies if needed? That appears increasingly unlikely.
The US remains committed by law to maintaining a minimum level of troops in Europe, set at 76,000. There are currently around 85,000 US troops stationed in Europe, but this does not include another 20,000 troops on short term, nine-month rotations. These include at least one division assigned to the V Corps, as well as specialist air-defence, artillery and aviation brigades. Nonetheless, the President could do several things without leaving the overall structure of Nato. He could reduce troops to the minimum level and within that number, reduce high-end capabilities; close bases; and restrict the funding available to those units that remain to reduce training levels, ammunition stocks, spare parts and so on. Reducing basing also means a loss of the ability to reinforce at times of crisis, even if there was the will to do so.
If any or all of this were to come about, European countries would have no option but to spend the money on defence that most have pledged to do, but most, with the exceptions of Germany, Poland and Finland, are not doing. How much Germany spends is, however, irrelevant since its constitution severely restricts what German armed forces may do. European states would also be obliged to cooperate more closely in common equipment procurement, supply contracts, air defence and cyber integration and maritime security. This would be necessary and right.
What is not right is that the Starmer government will use this to creep back into the EU through the back door, in defiance of the mandate delivered in the Brexit Referendum. Armed forces are an instrument and a demonstration of our national sovereignty: to hand control of defence and security to another body, especially an unelected body such as the EU Commission, fatally damages that sovereignty. EU collective defence and security arrangements, including Permanent Structures Co-operation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), the Co-ordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and the Common Security and Defence Plan (CSDP) are all about removing national sovereign control over the armed forces and in doing so, actually undermine collective security.
Another important casualty of a US withdrawal from Nato, or a compromise of its commitment, would be the Five-Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement involving the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Since security is fundamentally built on timely and accurate intelligence, this could only be damaging to all the parties involved.
So who would stand to gain by a US withdrawal, or reduction? Not the US taxpayer, since the units brought home would have to be re-housed and provided for – something the Cameron government was warned about when it blithely announced the withdrawal of British troops from Germany – but ignored. The US Armed forces would lose command positions, the ability to operate with allies and the morale benefits of postings in Europe. The Russians of course must be laughing themselves silly. Aid to Ukraine is already much reduced and would likely disappear completely. So too would the willingness to confront any Russian action short of major war. And what will the Chinese make of it? A US unwillingness to commit to allies in Europe will very likely be seen as unwillingness to commit to allies anywhere. What price Taiwan?
