THE CURRENT elite-driven narrative that ‘there are too many people on the planet’ is really just another iteration and implementation of centuries of rule, coercion and control by a few aristocratic families, forged through close ties with corporations, institutions, and the military. Where ancient slave economies were characterised by the use of direct force, Eddie Hobbs has pointed out that ‘the global elite now maintain control through economic and political means rather than through direct hereditary rule’. Similarly, the American political scientist Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ to describe the use of cooperation rather than coercion to explain the broader nuances of contemporary political influence. Whilst one might be rightly cynical of the perspective of a man who actively served in the State Department, Pentagon and intelligence communities under the Carter and Clinton presidencies, there is a clear sense that modern governance, particularly in the West, has been increasingly about shaping the views of the majority through more complex and multifaceted demonstrations of power.
Until recently, the evolution of climate change governance was a great example of the use of soft power by political leaders. As Jacob Nordangård has documented, the group of people who originally sought to establish the climate agenda in mainstream politics did so patiently over a long period of time. The guiding narrative itself has shifted and changed a great deal from the time of the first Rockefeller-funded research in the 1950s.
In the UK, for example, the way that this unfolded can be tracked through three distinct phases: firstly, market-oriented policies were mobilised through the deployment of economic instruments; secondly, the roll out of a third way state-market hybrid incorporating a large scale programme of cultural nudging and social engineering; and finally, a Net Zero top-down programme, characterised by direct state enforcement, the restriction of choice, and the replacement of the shareholder-driven business model by Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG).
In his recent book Rockefeller: Controlling the Game, Jacob Nordangård traces the beginnings of the climate change political agenda to Rockefeller-funded research which took place in the early to mid-1950s. He reasons that the Malthusian inclinations and distrust of the masses – once openly voiced by the wealthy elite but then driven underground by the visceral brutality of the Nazis’ own eugenics programme – found a suitable narrative by which to justify a continuation of their obsession with ‘population control’. A few years of sexed-up research later, emphasising the dangers of a changing climate and the central role of the growing masses in this emerging scenario, this was soon dovetailed with other supposed impacts on the earth’s ecosystems which appeared at this time.
As Niall McCrae documents in Green in Tooth and Claw: The Misanthropic Mission of Climate Alarm, 1968 became a kind of ‘year zero’ for the demonisation of mankind. This was the year the Club of Rome was founded, funded by known enthusiasts of eugenics, and which saw Paul R. Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb argue that a growing global population would lead to catastrophic impacts on the environment, on the planet, and on human wellbeing. Environmental lobby groups, civil society organisations, and left-wing think tanks all coalesced around this argument, beginning a massive political push for sustainable development and a challenge to the premise of capitalism itself.
Clearly at this point, the suggested sub-narrative of reigning in market forces would not have floated politically during this time. A period characterised by the ongoing globalization of the economy and the soon-to-emerge influence of neoliberalist ideology into the 80s and 90s would have been a considerable challenge to overcome. This was evidenced in the 1990s when a proposed carbon tax in the EU was rejected by the vetoing power of the corporate and business community. Instead, the case was made harmonizing both pathways. The climate lobby suggested low-key cost-benefit analyses which supplement ‘business as usual’, whilst taking into account a changing investment landscape characterised by ‘environmental externalities’.
In Blueprint for a Green Economy, David Pearce set out for the UK Government one of the first cost-benefit analyses of the role of ‘environmental services’, regarding the costs of pollution, negative impacts on the environment brought about by the free market, and the depletion of natural resources. Pearce argued that these services had been severely undervalued, should be measured and costed, and incentives introduced which would minimise or deter polluting activities for companies and businesses. Pearce argued that market-based instruments, such as pollution taxes, tradeable permits, and ‘compensation for conservations, would work within a market framework. Pearce focused primarily on ‘upstream emissions’ (those directly attributed to producers and manufacturers).
The first UK Government policy introduced under these terms was in the electricity sector – the ‘Fossil Fuel Levy’. This policy was intended to incentivise electricity producers to diversify their supply to include non-fossil fuel generated electricity. In a similar way, the ‘Fuel Price Escalator’ introduced an environmental levy on fuel use and was designed to discourage unnecessary journeys. The aim during this period was ‘light-touch policies’ which would not disturb the prevailing market framework (or indeed consumers) unduly.
The incoming New Labour Government of 1997 upped the environmental ante and embraced the increased international profile of climate change. As well as utilizing their ‘third way’ state-market approach in this area (i.e. more direct taxation through landfill tax, congestion charges in road transport, energy performance certificates in new house builds), the Blair Government also encouraged public-private partnerships around sustainability objectives and a programme of social/cultural engineering around environmental attitudes, choices and behaviours in consumers. This approach looked to harness the interface between people and technology, encouraging people to drive/fly less, choose energy efficient appliances, and turn down/switch off in the home. The Blair Government was more committed to mainstreaming environmental objectives into policy than the previous government and its ambitions were clarified by the 2008 Climate Change Act (the first one of its kind internationally) which committed the UK to reducing its carbon emissions by 60 per cent (changed to 80 per cent) by 2050.
After an extensive period of lobbying, cajoling, and, of course, agenda-dependent financing to the right people, the climate agenda pushers worked with, alongside, and then inside governments, corporations, and academic institutions, aiming to establish and normalise policies and uphold political trajectories.
Until recently, the climate lobby has seemingly been reasonably happy for the climate narrative to shadow the predominant ideology of democratic societies and for politicians to adopt soft power in their approach to this conundrum. However, with the clarion call that ‘we are running out of time’ getting ever louder and gaining more political currency than ever before, they have now moved in for the kill. The current Net Zero phase reveals to us what the end-game of the climate lobby has always been – the end of, or at the very least a massive diminution of, capitalism; a closely regulated society based on de-growth and the ringfencing of the environment and planetary resources; a vastly reduced and controlled population; and creeping draconian control measures which will take us back to feudalism or, very probably, early slave society.
