IT IS now proving very difficult for any outside party to get information out of Iran. In addition to shutting down the mobile network and the internet, it seems that the authorities are now deploying military jammers to shut down access to Elon Musk’s Starlink, which was being used as an alternative provider.
This is said to be a game-changer as the jamming is far more effective than has previously been experienced. Users are reporting that the initial disruption of about 30 per cent of Starlink’s uplink and downlink traffic has risen ‘to more than 80 per cent’.
Keeping the world in the dark about the extent and violence of the repression again the protesters is a vital part of the ayatollahs’ containment strategy, used before in previous uprisings to deadly effect.
Thus, with President Trump being briefed on new options for military strikes in Iran as he considers making good his threat to attack the country for cracking down on protesters, degrading the Iranian jamming network is an obvious priority.
Given the scale and intensity of the jamming, this on the face of it would be a rewarding target for intervention as it is unlikely that the effects being experienced have been achieved with indigenous technology, even if enough systems were available and haven’t already been degraded by previous strikes.
However, it has recently been confirmed that the Russians have supplied Iran with a number of Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems, capable of delivering the effects being experienced with the specific ability to jam low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites of the type used by the Starlink network.
Furthermore, there have been reports of repeated heavy airlift flights between southern Russia and Iran over the 2025–2026 year-end period, using Ilyushin Il-76TD military freighters sporting civilian registrations.
It is quite plausible, therefore, that some of the more recent flights have been delivering Krasukha-4 units which, at about 35 tons for each vehicle, could easily be carried by an Ilyushin freighter with its 50-ton payload capability and its capacious cargo hold designed for airlifting outsize truck-mounted military equipment.
This equipment might prove to be not just a priority target but also an extremely attractive one for Trump because it is well within the capability of the US Air Force to destroy such targets.
As high-powered jamming units, their emissions are easily detectable by electronic intelligence (ELINT) platforms such as the RC-135 (Rivet Joint) or the US Navy EP-3 (Orion) aircraft from a distance of hundreds of miles.
The jammers can also be detected by commercial and military space-based RF monitoring systems (similar to those used by companies like HawkEye 360) which can pick up and geolocate high-power microwave emitters of the type used by the Krasukha-4 units.
In terms of the attack capability needed, the US has long experience in this field and a number of suitable air-launched missiles in its inventory under the generic category of HARM (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile).
These include the basic AGM-88, with a range of about 99 miles under optimal conditions to the AGM-88E, the upgraded version with millimetre-wave radar for terminal guidance (to counter emitter shutdown), plus GPS/INS backup which is particularly effective against time-critical/mobile targets like jammers.
In all probability, any attack might use the AGM-88G, an extended range version, successfully tested in May with roughly double the range (about 200 miles) of the standard missile.
These missiles are designed for standoff delivery from platforms like F-35 or EA-18G Growler. They are due in service this year 2026 and an action against Iranian assets would be a useful test for a newly acquired weapon.
If Trump wants an element of deniability, though, the Israelis have their own capabilities in their Delilah – a standoff air-launched cruise missile with a range of around 155 miles. Upgraded versions have anti-radar/anti-radiation capabilities and – possibly quite useful in any attack on Iran – have a loiter capability which means they can hang around for a while, waiting for silent emitters to switch on when they think as attack is over.
Failing that, Israel also integrates US-supplied HARMs/AARGMs on its F-16s, F-15s, and F-35s and, like the USAF, has considerable experience with this weaponry, which was used extensively last year in the so-called 12-day war.
Despite the undoubted capabilities of these wunderwaffen, Trump would not get away with launching a few quick sorties to achieve the desired effect. Despite being degraded during the 12-day war, the Iranians still have a significant air-defence capability, which may have been reinforced and upgraded by recent Russian deliveries.
The Iranians are also known to have taken delivery of a number of Murmansk BN electronic warfare systems, which have formidable capabilities, with a proven ability to interfere with F-35 systems and those of other stealth aircraft.
Before targeting the jamming systems, therefore, the USAF would need to execute what is known in the trade as the classic SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences) playbook, locating and destroying Iranian radars, control centres and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as degrading EW assets geared to air defence, especially as the jamming systems are likely to be heavily defended.
Only once the initial wave had been successful would it be safe to target the jammers, launching a series of precise strikes – the locations of the jammers possibly confirmed by ground intelligence, courtesy of Mossad.
Here, the very power of the Krasukha-4 system works against itself. Not only is it eminently detectable, with a jamming radius of 125-150 miles for broadband suppression of airborne/LEO/SATCOM signals, only an estimated 8-20 units would be sufficient to deliver the effects experienced.
At anything up to $10million (£7million) per operational unit, this is a relatively expensive asset and it is unlikely that an economically stressed Iran will be able to afford much redundancy.
Each unit comprises two truck-mounted units, one for the jamming equipment and antennas and the other for command and control. With generators and masts, plus ancillary equipment, they are not easy to conceal and will not be easy to replace.
Even without targeting any additional indigenous equipment, it is probable that taking out the entire Krasukha-4 network would restore Starlink functionality in some areas to as much as 90 per cent, although perhaps only 60 per cent in areas such as Tehran where there are multiple transmitters, if there are survivors or redundancy.
In rural/peripheral regions and areas, away from jammer concentrations, there would be near-full or full restoration. Many users could achieve normal or near-normal performance.
At post-attack levels, the worst of the degraded services would still be usable, albeit with slow speeds and occasional drops. Crucially, video/text transmission would be possible, providing a vital link between the protesters and the outside world.
There is probably no one thing that could have a greater effect on the morale of the protesters, demonstrating that they are not alone in their struggle, while a successful attack would also deprive the ayatollahs of their most powerful weapon – the ability to isolate the protesters and engage in a campaign of terror free from external observation.
If Trump wants a quick hit, therefore, to show his support in a very practical way with a very high probability of success – and with minimum collateral damage – he need look no further than an attack on the jammers. No doubt the Israelis would be keen to help, and within a matter of days, the window on the mullahs could be restored.
This article appeared in Turbulent Times on January 12, 2026, and is republished by kind permission.
